Ukraine’s Terrible Choice

In his keynote speech at the Munich Security Conference in mid-February, US Vice President J.D. Vance argued that European illiberalism (at least, the kind directed at conservatives) is a more pressing issue than the threat posed to the continent by Russia. That order of priorities could hardly be more wrong. After all, at this year’s meeting—the most consequential since the annual symposium was inaugurated in 1963—the very survival of Ukraine as a sovereign state was hanging in the balance. As attendees listened to Vance scold and lecture them, they waited in vain for an acknowledgement of our moment’s grave geopolitical challenges and Ukraine’s growing peril. So badly did Vance misjudge the occasion that his speech was widely dismissed as irrelevant.

Conference chairman Christoph Heusgen found Vance’s remarks so upsetting that he burst into tears during his closing speech as he observed that the US and Europe may no longer share the same values (a display that will have done little to reassure Americans sceptical of European fortitude). The following week, Friedrich Merz, leader of Germany’s CDU/CSU party, expressed the same sentiments as Heusgen, but without the tears. During a televised roundtable discussion—broadcast after exit polls indicated that his party had come first in Sunday’s national elections but before he was officially named German chancellor—Merz pronounced the transatlantic alliance dead. Europe, he warned, could no longer rely upon the protection of the United States: 

My absolute priority will be to strengthen Europe as quickly as possible so that, step by step, we can really achieve independence from the USA. I would never have believed that I would have to say something like that on television. But at the very least, after Donald Trump’s statements last week, it is clear that the Americans—at least, this part of the Americans in this administration—are largely indifferent to the fate of Europe.

The Trump administration had spent the weeks before the German election doing what it could to accelerate a rightward and pro-Russian shift already evident in European politics. During his visit to Germany, the US vice president declined to meet Germany’s then-chancellor Olaf Scholz, but he did find time to sit down with Alice Weidel, leader of the country’s Putin-sympathetic far-right opposition party, Alternativ für Deutschland (AfD). There can be “no room for firewalls,” Vance instructed the Munich conference, a reference to the political taboo against speaking to radical populists like Weidel. Senior Donald Trump advisor Elon Musk, meanwhile, has been using his platform at X and his public appearances to urge German voters to support the AfD if they want to save their country.

“Europe faces many challenges,” Vance told Munich attendees the previous week, “but the crisis this continent faces right now, the crisis I believe we all face together, is one of your own making. If you’re running in fear of your own voters, there is nothing America can do for you, nor for that matter is there anything that you can do for the American people who elected me and elected President Trump.” On Sunday night, the vote share of Sholz’s Social Democratic Party slumped to just over sixteen percent against the CDU/CSU’s 28.6 percent. The AfD surged into second place with 20.8 percent. The AfD will not be allowed into government, but it will now be the official opposition in the German Bundestag.

Merz—and many other European politicians besides—believe that all this diplomatic and rhetorical activity on the part of the Trump administration amounted to interference in the continent’s elections. “The [electoral] interventions from Washington were no less dramatic and drastic and ultimately outrageous than the interventions we have seen from Moscow,” Merz remarked on Sunday night as the exit-poll data emerged. “We are under such massive pressure from two sides that my top priority is to create unity in Europe.” A formal meeting of European heads of state is planned for 6 March, at which an attempt will be made to thrash out a European defence strategy. Trump will not be present.

Donald Trump’s first weeks in power, meanwhile, have demonstrated that his pre-election promises of a new radicalism were not mere bloviating. In his latest cull of high-level officials, he fired many of America’s top military officers. This is within his rights as president, but it is a break with convention and it looks a lot like a political purge. Those unceremoniously dismissed include Air Force general Charles Q. Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Admiral Lisa Franchetti, head of the Navy; General James Slife, vice chief of the Air Force and the top three lawyers for Army, Navy, and Air Force. Air Force general Dan Caine, whom Trump met at the Conservative Political Action Conference in 2019, has been selected to replace Brown as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

All of those fired—and especially General Brown—were shown the door with presidential expressions of gratitude and esteem. It is worth noting, however, that the administration’s new defence secretary, Pete Hegseth, said during his Senate confirmation hearings last month that Brown deserved to be fired for his allegedly excessive focus on diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) programs in the military. General Brown was, perhaps not coincidentally, the second black American to be chairman of the Joint Chiefs after General Colin Powell (1989–93). Admiral Franchetti was the first female head of the Navy. 

Intense concern with the impact of DEI-informed policies upon hiring and promotion practices lies at the very heart of the Trump presidency. This concern was central to Vance’s Munich speech—an all-embracing belief that such policies contribute to weakness and underperformance in all areas, including the execution of America’s military capabilities, its economic competitiveness, and the operation of its federal institutions.

Trump and the DEI Counter-Revolution

Civil-rights law made the DEI world; civil-rights reform can unmake it.

QuilletteThomas F. Powers

The swingeing assault on the prevailing DEI regime quickly emerged as the most popular of Trump’s early decisions. This was not, however, indicative of a universally popular approach: nearly three-quarters of those polled by Pew in January/February of this year said they disapproved of the amnesty granted to insurrectionists convicted of their part in the attack on the US Capitol in January 2021. Trump was unmoved by this popular sentiment, however. “They didn’t assault,” he said of the rioting men and women he had incited. “They were assaulted, and what I did was a great thing for humanity.” 

This attitude, which informs many of the administration’s early acts, presages vast and alarming shifts in the direction of authoritarian rule. Historian and Atlantic columnist Anne Applebaum has even described it as a kind of “regime change.” But of all the sharp breaks with past procedure and policy made by the new US administration, Trump’s apparent obeisance to Russian President Vladimir Putin is by far the most consequential. It is also the most dangerous—most obviously for Ukraine, of course, but also for Europe, especially central Europe, and for the conduct of international relations and prospects of global stability.

In a discussion with fellow New York Times columnist Masha Gessen and opinion editor Patrick Healy, Bret Stephens described the Trump administration’s Ukraine policy as:

A reversal in our vision of who counts as a democrat or a dictator. A reversal in who counts as a friend or an adversary. A reversal in our approach to the domestic politics of allied states. A reversal in the overall direction of our post-World War II foreign policy, which was about supporting embattled or enfeebled allies, promoting economic liberalization, embracing democracy or at least nontotalitarian states, favouring open societies over closed ones. It’s a world turned upside down.

And in this upside-down world, policy decisions will no longer be informed by shared values, alliances, or commitments, but by raw assessments of naked power and self-interest. This is the analysis that the Trump administration is now bringing to bear on the unfolding tragedy in Ukraine. The unbridled contempt that Trump and his vice president display for Europe—and for the European Union, in particular—arises in part from a belief that its member states have neglected to provide for their own protection. Europe therefore finds itself helpless before the unforgiving truths of a war it is unable to either prosecute or settle by itself.

The force of that argument is slowly being acknowledged by Europeans, if only because Trump has left them with no choice. In an editorial, the usually jaunty Economist writes:

Let us spell out the reality Europe faces. It is an indebted, ageing continent that is barely growing and cannot defend itself or project hard power. Global rules on trade, borders, defence and technology are being ripped up. If Russia invades one of the Baltic states, or uses disinformation and sabotage to destabilise eastern Europe, what precisely will Europe do?

What indeed? The blows from Europe’s former ally keep landing: in addition to Vance’s Munich lecture, US Defence Secretary Hegseth has flatly stated that the US is no longer “primarily focused” on Europe’s security, and Trump is currently reporting “productive” conversations with Putin and preparing to sideline Europe in any settlement of the war. As Lawrence Freedman, an eminent international-relations analyst and emeritus professor of War Studies at King’s College London, has written:

While Trump and his aides eventually acknowledged it would be difficult to do a deal on Ukraine’s future without the Ukrainians, a possible European role was discussed only in vague terms, as the Russians made clear their presence would not be welcome. All that was suggested was that European leaders come up with proposals for how they might guarantee Ukraine’s security in the aftermath of whatever deal was agreed.

Among the major European states, only the UK has regularly observed the NATO rule that at least two percent of GDP should be spent on defence. Other wealthy countries—such as Germany, France, and Italy—have consistently fallen short of that agreed target. In the last two years, major increases in defence expenditure in most states, especially Germany, have brought them over the two-percent line. But Trump is now demanding five percent, and this new demand comes at a time when much of Europe is already struggling with rising prices and falling exports.

European nations that were once close American allies bound by common values and strategic interests are now reduced to the humiliating status of mendicants to the US president, pleading for a place at the negotiating table. Both UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer and French President Emmanuel Macron will meet Trump this week and attempt to convince him that US security guarantees remain an essential part—the essential part—of any future agreement. Their mission is not impossible, but it is certainly daunting. As Vance’s decision to snub Scholz and call on the AfD’s leader shows, the administration openly prefers the New Right politicians and parties to the old parties of the European centre.

To date, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has done her best to forge a close friendship with Trump and Elon Musk, in an attempt to position herself as an Atlantic bridge between Europe and the US (a special position once occupied by the UK). Meloni’s euroscepticism and personal history as a member of the far-right recommends her to America’s new leaders, but she has also been a strong advocate of support for Ukraine. She is going to find it hard to justify Trump’s apparent eagerness to give Putin whatever he wants, especially to her European colleagues, now unceremoniously dumped on the sidelines.

Russia believes—or says it believes—that it is in a strong military position in Ukraine, and therefore in a strong negotiating position with respect to a settlement. After a woeful record on the battlefield in the first year and a half of the war, its forces have finally gained the upper hand. It has managed to convince key members of the Trump administration—including the president himself—that the concession of Russian military gains is simply a recognition of reality. As Vance recently tweeted:

But the Russian position is largely a bluff. Although most of the country’s economy is now given over to war production, that very fact means that consumers are suffering and inflation is rising along with public dissatisfaction. As Shashank Joshi, the Economist’s defence editor and a visiting fellow at the War Studies department at KCL, argued in a rejoinder to Vance:

I’ve been writing on this war for three years. I (and my colleagues) have never been afraid of candidly reporting on Ukraine’s deficiencies in firepower & manpower. That hasn’t always made us popular.

Numerical disadvantages are not always decisive. Russia’s artillery advantage has narrowed considerably while it remains on the offensive. Its advantages have translated into desultory territorial gains at massive human cost, which will necessitate painful political trade-offs down the line. As [Guardian contributor Jack Watling] recently noted, the margin of Russia’s advantage is thin.

That is why, with continued assistance—assistance that is & has for sometime been majority supplied *by Europe*, notwithstanding the administration’s lies—Ukraine can remain on the strategic defensive at modest financial cost to allies. Its position is difficult but not dire. Anyone who wants a robust deal should want to narrow Russia’s margin of advantage as quickly and effectively as possible.

This is not some pie in sky outsider judgment. It was American generals in EUCOM & in DoD who worked with Ukraine to develop a plan to this end in October, a plan which was agreed during Lloyd Austin’s visit to Kyiv. That plan required Ukraine to make certain choices around the allocation of resources (i.e not over-committing in Kursk or feeding troops piecemeal to the front) but it took into account Ukraine’s manpower problems.

Where I partially agree with Vance is that Ukraine does not have an obvious pathway to victory in the sense of restoring the strategic offensive and complete territorial restitution. I won’t criticise the admin for exploring & seeking a negotiated end to the war. But rushing into a bad deal & telegraphing your desperation for one weakens both America’s hand & that of Ukraine.

America has started these negotiations by extorting Ukraine for minerals and attacking its president. Where is the heightened political, economic or military pressure on Russia? Why is it absent? Abusing the press isn’t an answer to these questions.

Vance is also wrong in his claim to [historian Niall Ferguson] that the US has given nothing up. An invitation back to G7, mutual presidential visits, vicious & dishonest attacks on the elected Ukrainian present, blocking G7 statements on Russian aggression—these are all gifts to the Kremlin. There are no good reasons to do these things right now other than desperation for a deal & normalisation.

Russian personnel losses have indeed been huge—comparable to those suffered by combatants during the major battles of WWI (and in similar conditions of attritional trench warfare). Figures released by the Russian general staff show that, by late January of this year, their military losses had already reached 826,820 and were steadily approaching the one-million mark. Public protests in Russia against the war are now rare, but that is partly because they are energetically repressed, and partly because Russia has already haemorrhaged over a million citizens. Many of these exiles were young opponents of the war, and with their departure, Russia has lost a large part of its future intelligentsia, skilled white- and blue-collar workers, and future leaders.

Ukrainian losses have been far smaller—estimates sat at around 60,000 by the end of last year. But Ukraine has a much smaller population and its army is still being forced into retreat. The abrupt reversal of US policy places the Ukrainians at the mercy of an American president who clearly dislikes their leader intensely and wants him (and everyone else) to know it. As part of a campaign of gratuitous denigration, Trump has falsely claimed that Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky has approval ratings of four percent; that he is an unelected dictator; that he wishes the war to continue so he can continue to ride the “gravy train” of US assistance; and that he “should never have started” a war that began with his country’s invasion by a predatory irredentist neighbour.

In an article for the Atlantic late in Trump’s 2016 campaign for the presidency, Salena Zito argued that it might be better to take Trump “seriously but not literally.” It is probably best to consider Trump’s stated designs on Canada and Greenland in this light. It is doubtful that Trump literally wants to annex either country, but he is certainly serious about availing himself of those countries’ resources. The same avarice is now also a critical component of America’s mercenary Ukraine policy.

The Ultimate Betrayal

America just switched sides in the Ukraine war.

QuilletteFrancis Fukuyama

Specifically, Trump has his eye on Ukraine’s reserves of rare-earth minerals, the value of which will only rise due to their use in the manufacture of batteries, superconductors, wind turbines, and more. These products are expected to provide the basis of much future growth, and Trump wants at least half of whatever Ukraine owns. Talks are now underway, but the Ukrainian president has so far been reluctant to surrender his country’s buried treasure, at least not under the extortionate terms proposed by the US administration.

The Trump administration says the deal they seek merely allows Ukraine to compensate the US for its past support in exchange for security guarantees. During a visit to Kiev, the US treasury secretary, Scott Bessent, told Zelensky that such an agreement would provide his country with protection, a position he elaborated in an article for the Financial Times:

We know Ukraine’s economic future in a time of peace can be more prosperous than at any other point in the nation’s history, and a partnership with Americans will ensure its prosperity. President Zelenskyy recognises this and so does President Trump. With these facts in mind, I travelled to Kyiv on my first international visit as the secretary of the Treasury with a proposal that demonstrates our long-term commitment to a free and secure Ukraine—an agreement focused on turbocharging the country’s economic growth.

This partnership will support the US’s continued commitment to the people of Ukraine as well as lay the foundation for a robust reconstruction of the Ukrainian economy. While asset prices can be fickle, Ukrainian debt has been trading up on the news, signalling that Ukraine’s creditors and financial markets appreciate the benefits of the economic partnership.

He added:

The terms of this partnership will mobilise American talent, capital, and high standards and governance to accelerate Ukraine’s recovery and sends a clear message to Russia that the US is invested in a free and prosperous Ukraine over the long term.

The US is a durable and long-term partner in this relationship. The proceeds from future revenue streams would be reinvested back into key sectors focused on unlocking more of Ukraine’s growth assets.

In truth, nothing is certain except the US president’s desire to dominate friends and foes alike with capricious shifts of policy, and an underlying contempt for any institutions, rules, and norms that hinder the pursuit of American self-interest. For a man approaching eighty, Trump remains a remarkable mover and a violent shaker. But as US General H.R. McMaster, who served as US national security adviser during Trump’s first presidential term (a post he eventually resigned), observed during a recent event at the London think tank Policy Exchange, Trump confronts a much more dangerous world than he did in his first term. 

McMaster acknowledged that the weakness projected by US Presidents Barack Obama and Joe Biden had incentivised hostile actions on the part of Russia, China, and Iran. And although he and Trump disagreed about much during the first Trump administration, he says that Tump did seem to understand that Russia had to be confronted. Even now, McMaster clings to an implausible belief that America will, when necessary, stand with its Western allies once more. “It’s a lot cheaper to avoid a war than to fight one,” McMaster remarked. “There are likely to be US security guarantees.”

That might have been true under every other US president, but it is a very unsafe assumption given Trump’s proclivities and his administration’s eagerness to flaunt its Russian sympathies in international fora.

Following a tense call with Canada’s Prime Minister Justin Trudeau on 22 February, the White House readout reported: “Prime Minister Trudeau echoed President Trump’s desire to see an end to the [Ukraine] war and acknowledged that President Trump is the only world leader who can push through a just and lasting peace.” This may yet turn out to be the case, a possibility now generally—if bitterly—agreed, even by the sidelined Europeans, faute de mieux. The bones of a possible deal are reportedly being arranged behind the scenes. If Trump can convince Zelensky—or any future Ukrainian leader, if he succeeds in displacing this one—that the United States should be permitted to plunder Ukraine’s minerals as payment for past and future support, then Ukraine will become an American protectorate.

That is not an outcome that will thrill Ukrainians after three years of valiant resistance to punishing Russian aggression. Unless Europe can find the will and a way to finance Ukraine’s fight for survival, the only alternative seems to be the loss of any kind of protection at all, which would leave the country at the mercy of the carnivorous Russian bear. At which point, the horrors already visited on eastern Ukraine—including the systematic murder of prisoners of war—would spread across the rest of the country in short order. Bowing to the demands of a venal US President will be hard for a ravaged country to accept. But given the available options, Zelensky has no real choice.