What I Learnt Interviewing Jihadists
A conversation about Iran, Israel, and Islamic terrorism with Iraqi researcher Suha Hassen.
My guest, Suha Hassen, is originally from Iraq and now lives in the United States, where she is currently a doctoral candidate at George Mason University’s School of Conflict Analysis and Resolution. Suha’s work is crucial in promoting global safety by countering extremist narratives.
In this conversation, Suha discusses the shifting dynamics within Islam, including how Hamas, traditionally Sunni, is moving towards Shi’ism. She explores the long-term goals of Islamist groups, their aim to convert the world to Islam, and why Hamas’s use of women and children as human shields is viewed differently from similar actions by ISIS. Suha also highlights the key differences between ISIS and Hamas, the potential presence of Iranian sleeper cells in the West, and the need for a modern interpretation of Islam. Additionally, she addresses the deep-seated issues Islam has with Jewish people, including extremist goals of extermination, and the role of social media in jihadist recruitment.
Due to the poor audio quality of the recording, we will not be publishing this conversation as an audio-only version on podcast platforms. If you’d prefer to listen to the podcast, you can do so by watching the captioned video found below.
ZB: Suha, could you tell the audience a little bit about your expertise and how you came to study this topic?
SH: I’m currently a PhD candidate in the School of Conflict Analysis at George Mason University, specialising in terrorism and homeland security. For the past seven years, I’ve focused on terrorism, particularly Islamist terrorist groups. Before that, I completed a Master’s at Oregon State University, where I spent two years researching ISIS around 2014–16. My journey with ISIS and other Islamist terrorist groups began about seven to eight years ago.
Currently, my dissertation investigates why and how individuals decide to join ISIS. I believe I’m the first Iraqi woman, and likely the first from a minority group, to go to Iraq and conduct face-to-face interviews with ISIS fighters. Last summer, I conducted around 80 interviews with three groups: local Iraqis and Syrians, Arabs from the broader Middle East, and internationals, including those from Europe and other countries. My goal was to understand what drives these people to join ISIS as an organisation and a movement.
During this process, I realised it wasn’t enough to rely on online analysis or media reports. I wanted to observe these people face-to-face, understand their motivations, and make comparisons. I was particularly interested in the international fighters because of my focus on national security, especially regarding the United States. Jihadist groups like these will never stop, but understanding what’s going on in their minds can shift the narrative. This understanding has also helped me analyse statements from figures like Yahya Sinwar and Hezbollah.
The most important aspect for me was to understand this from an Arabic perspective. I’m originally from Iraq and speak Arabic, so I didn’t want an interpreter or mediator to interfere in the process. I’ve found that when translation occurs, there can be misunderstandings that impact counter-terrorism policies. If we don’t fully understand what these groups are saying, we can’t accurately assess their behaviour or the collective operations of terrorist organisations.
ZB: Very important work. Thank you for doing it, as it helps keep us all safe.
What did you find from your interviews?
SH: Since I haven’t defended my dissertation yet, it’s a bit difficult to discuss specifics, but in general, I found that there’s a strong religious root in the stories of these jihadist groups. Denying this religious root distorts the narrative and makes counter-terrorism efforts less effective. My finding suggests that we need to open religious books and retell the story accurately.
For example, in his book “Throne of Salvation,” Yahya Sinwar speaks about the “Great Liberation.” This term has significant religious, cultural, historical, and societal roots. It’s not just about its literal meaning; there’s a deeper narrative that involves creating chaos and mass destruction to make the next move. Initially, I thought it was about demonising Jewish people, then the West, but there’s another layer—demonising moderate Muslims.
This narrative of demonising Muslims creates two types of people, especially in Western countries like the United States. If Muslims feel guilt and shame, they become isolated and disconnected, which can lead to the creation of internal enemies within Western societies. This is what we’re seeing now with the rise of isolation and lack of belonging among Muslim communities in the West.
ZB: So, the goal is to make some diaspora groups feel like outsiders, to stir up trouble so they want to join this cause. Is that correct?
SH: Yes, that’s correct. But we need to understand that this narrative has already taken root. Many people say they don’t belong, that they don’t have a place. When they feel this way, they seek out something to belong to, which can lead them to join extremist groups. This is one of the advantages of conducting face-to-face interviews with former ISIS fighters—they reveal the true story and the actual meaning of these narratives.
ZB: How much of the narrative is about fixing a past or historical wrong, like the shame of losing land?
SH: Let’s return to the narrative of jihad... Do we understand jihad very well? For example, here’s something I’ve explained many times, but I think we still need to dig deeper into it. There are three levels of Muslim identity. This identity is actually instilled from the first day a baby is born because there’s a narrative called Bismillahir Rahmanir Raheem—you are born a Muslim. It’s like the first moment you see life; it becomes as essential as food and daily actions. But within this Muslim identity, there are three levels.
One is the societal level, which is how most Muslims operate. It’s about helping each other, living in a community, and fostering a brotherly relationship. This is generally positive, as it promotes cooperation within communities. But then there’s the second level, which is the moral level. Here, you feel a responsibility to fix what is wrong. However, there are limits—you are not obligated to fix the entire world.
What jihadist groups do is instigate this moral level, pushing the idea that you must fix the world. For example, they might say you need to help women in Palestine, using the bloodshed in the war as a call to action. But this is still a moral level. Then, they elevate it to the spiritual level, which is the highest level of jihad. Even in the Quran, it’s not required for women and children to reach this level. However, Hamas and possibly Hezbollah are now pushing this spiritual level, requiring women and children to fight.
That’s my prediction. We might start seeing suicide attacks in Western countries, in Jordan, in Egypt—because they are pushing this spiritual level, which Hamas has been working on since October 7. I’ve been following Hamas closely to understand their thinking. Even if Hamas is defeated, they might create another group, and another, and another.
The core of Islam, especially in jihad, is the sanctity of Muslim blood. This is central to the Quran. So why does Hamas sacrifice their people, especially children, by using them as human shields? Is it to provoke an emotional response? If more blood is shed, it pushes people emotionally, but it also creates more groups, more generations.
ZB: Yes, I’ve heard Hamas leaders say that the shedding of blood, especially of children and women, invigorates them to fight more.
SH: Yes, it invigorates them, but it’s not just about fighting more—it’s about creating more groups and more generations. I’ve recently seen many videos from Jordan showing six or seven-year-old kids holding weapons and saying, “We will go to jihad.” Why focus on this age in Jordan, a country that’s supposed to be more moderate?
ZB: I thought the monarchy in Jordan was keeping things more stable and preventing jihadi groups from gaining power. Is that correct?
SH: From what I’ve seen so far, if you just Google or go to YouTube, every hour there’s a new video about Gaza, Hamas, bloodshed, and women. There’s also the Nasheed al Islami, which is a call for jihad, accompanied by images of crying women. Since October 7, Hamas has centred its messaging on showing images of children and women.
ZB: Does this have anything to do with them knowing that people, especially in the West, get very emotional when they see women and children in pain? Is that part of their strategy?
SH: But I wouldn’t call it propaganda—it’s a project, a goal. If we say it’s propaganda, it sounds like they’re just recruiting here and there. But this is a long-term project: shaping the identity of jihad, shaping its narrative, and shaping its ideology. I’ve read hundreds of articles in Arabic, all of which say that jihad before October 7 is different from jihad after October 7. They are saying that the Islamic nation has awakened.
It’s very scary because if we think of Hamas as a short-term issue or just a flood, we miss the deeper meaning. What does the word “flood” mean in Islam, in our religion? It means bloodshed. So, it’s not just about the current conflict. They want to awaken this generation through bloodshed and the sacrifice of women.
ZB: And what’s the long-term goal here?
SH: The long-term goal is to get rid of Jewish people. That’s what Hassan Nasrallah said—out of the heart of Al Aqsa comes the great liberation. Their idea is to keep fighting until they achieve what they want. This is how Islam began: small, then expanding. Hamas may start with just a few thousand, but now they have people all around the world. They believe they are the true descendants of the Prophet Muhammad.
They see this as the beginning of Islam, with Muslims having been asleep for a long time. Now, they want to awaken them. But how does this happen? Hamas is the core, and then there’s the flood. Where does the flood end? It doesn’t. Generation after generation, even if a leader like Haniya is killed, it’s just the start—more leaders will come.
ZB: So, getting rid of Jews—by that, you mean fully exterminating the Jewish race. Why does Islam have an issue with Jews? Where does that begin?
SH: It’s a long story. So, the first text in the Quran draws a line between “us” and “them.” I remember that around 44 times, Jewish people and Israel are demonised, stigmatised, and described in various ways, sometimes even as monkeys. I’m sorry to say that, but this is the description found in the Quran. They’re described as dishonest and other negative traits—44 times, text by text.
So, if you imagine someone praying five times a day and reading these texts from the Quran, what does this do? It creates an orientation. As I mentioned before, Islam is all about narrative. But who shaped the narrative of the Quran? That’s where this animosity emerged.
ZB: You’re saying that out of the billions of Muslims in the world today, some are reciting these things about Jews being monkeys during their prayers?
SH: I wouldn’t generalise. Let’s not generalise because some people read it as a historical context, as a retelling of the journey of the Jewish people. But what Hamas and other jihadist groups are doing is trying to describe it as a current situation. For example, the Quran tells a story about something that happened to Moses. Some people read it as a historical story, but Hamas, Hezbollah, and similar groups insist on creating a living narrative, pulling people from the present time back to the past. Does that make sense?
ZB: Yeah. So aside from their goal of exterminating Jews, what other goals do they have?
SH: It’s often called the revival of the caliphate, but it’s more than that. Reviving the caliphate is just a small part of what's going on. They want to reshape the identity and ideology of jihad, which is already in process. Hamas, with the help of the media, is pushing this agenda. The media has done a terrible job here.
They need Muslims to perform their task by converting those around them to Islam. They want to extend Islam, changing not only their nations but also the identity of the West. Don’t think that the emergence of more children—six or seven-year-olds—happens by chance. There’s a story behind it.
ZB: So ideally, they want no other religions on earth, only Islam?
SH: That’s my conclusion so far. The concept of the “Great Liberation” is what they’re aiming for. They talk about “shahada” and “jihad.”
ZB: What does “shahada" mean?
SH: “Shahada” is about sacrificing yourself for the cause of Islam and the ummah. I’ve identified three levels of what “shahada” means. To be a “shahid,” you have three tasks: first, to elevate the word of Allah and maintain the Islamic religion; second, to engage in jihad for the safety of Muslims; and third, to protect the honour of the religion. Hamas keeps saying they are here to uphold the honour of their religion.
ZB: Wow. It’s hard, I think, for people in the West, like myself, to fully comprehend this because we celebrate pluralism and various cultures and religions. We think it’s a beautiful thing to have diverse groups of people, and the idea of having everyone be Muslim with no plurality is hard to grasp.
SH: Yes, it’s hard to imagine. That’s why it’s a struggle to fully articulate what they want from Muslims around the world. And why they call it the “Aqsa Flood.” Everything is connected to history and religion, which is why we need to be very accurate when translating words and understanding their cultural, historical, and religious meanings.
We need to piece together the whole picture and see what it looks like within the context of the Quran. I’ve been analysing these texts word by word, and if we don’t examine the root of each word, we’ll lose our way. By the way, it might be interesting to note that Hamas and Hezbollah usually communicate through this kind of narrative. The militias in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and with the Houthis do the same. If you go to Twitter, you’ll notice how they communicate using similar texts.
ZB: So they’re using the same texts?
SH: Yes, the same words with slight variations. If you’re not a native Arabic speaker, it can be hard to catch the subtle changes. There’s a connection between the Iraqi militia, Hezbollah, and Hamas. They’re all using the Quranic text to send signals to each other, communicating in a way that might not be obvious to outsiders.
ZB: What do you predict will happen in the near future with Iran, Hezbollah, and Israel?
SH: I’m still gathering my thoughts, but I think there will be small operations. We need to be very careful because Iran often uses sleeper cells. We might see operations on an individual level—small groups of two or three people. Iran uses the taqiyya system, which I’ve written a lot about. Taqiyya allows people to remain silent until they receive an order. We don’t know how many sleeper cells are out there. My prediction is that Iran will respond by using these people.
ZB: Are there sleeper cells in the West?
SH: That’s my prediction, yes. Taqiyya allows people to stay silent for 10 or 20 years until they receive orders. They integrate into communities and then act when the time comes. You might see something in Jordan, something here. This would be more painful for Western countries because they wouldn’t be able to directly connect it to Iran. Iran can act without revealing its direct involvement.
ZB: Do you think this is a good reason to reconsider immigration from Muslim-majority countries?
SH: Not to that level, but I would say we need to change the narrative we use when engaging with Muslims or people from Arabic countries. The current “us versus them” narrative isn’t helping. We should work to deconstruct Hamas’s narrative, Hezbollah’s narrative, and show people how they manipulate and use them as tools. Instead of focusing on immigration, let’s show Muslims in the West what these groups are really doing to them. So far, Hamas has succeeded in pulling people’s emotions to their side. We need to decode Hamas’s narrative, decode Iran’s narrative.
Since when have Sunni people felt like Iran is their saviour? This is a 1,400-year division, yet now some Sunni people align with Iran because they’ve been convinced that the West and Israel are their enemies. But no one is telling the real story—people in Gaza have lives, jobs, and families. Why are they being taken hostage? Why are children and disabled people being put on the front lines?
Let’s ask these questions and translate them into Arabic to present this narrative to the Arabic-speaking world.
ZB: Maybe it’s risky to do so—you could risk death.
SH: No, I don’t think it’s very risky. I think it’s more about no one really taking action. I’ve been thinking a lot about what’s going on. Why is Hamas leading the narrative? Why is Iran the leader of the narrative in the Middle East? This is Israel’s biggest problem—deconstructing and decoding Hamas’s narrative and retelling the story, showing that Israel isn’t the one who caused the suffering.
Perhaps by bringing in Arabic people, especially women who have lost their children and who see Hamas for what it is, and putting them in front of the camera, we could change the narrative. Let them tell their story: “I had a life, I had everything, but Hamas did this to me.” Before October 7th, we saw Hamas imposing heavy taxes on civilians in Gaza, imprisoning those who protested, and causing significant suffering. People were complaining about them long before October 7th. To divert attention from their economic failures and governance issues, Hamas opened this door to conflict. We need to remind people how life was under Hamas.
ZB: Iran is Shia, right?
SH: Yes, the majority of Iran is Shia.
ZB: Does that matter much in this context?
SH: Yes, it matters a lot because this is an Iranian project. They use Shia ideology as a powerful religious tool to extend their influence in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. But interestingly, Hamas is Sunni, yet it’s shifting its ideology towards Iran.
ZB: That’s interesting.
SH: I published an article at the beginning of the October 7th events in Homeland Security, discussing how we need to pay attention to every word. The first thing that grabbed my attention was the word “shaheed.” Prophet Muhammad is called a “shaheed,” and I’ve spent around 8 to 10 years studying Islamic fiqh—both Shia and Sunni. The differences between these groups are fascinating, and they deeply influence jihadist writings.
ZB: What is fiqh?
SH: Fiqh is the interpretation of the Quran and the teachings of Prophet Muhammad. There is Shia fiqh and Sunni fiqh. Understanding these interpretations is crucial because everything jihadist groups do is built on fiqh. For example, in Sunni fiqh, there’s zero mention of Prophet Muhammad being a “shaheed.” He died in his bed, not as a martyr. But in Shia fiqh, there’s a story that Muhammad was poisoned by a Jewish woman, and that’s why he died as a martyr. This narrative is used to shift behaviour and strategy, especially when groups like Hamas start aligning with Shia ideology.
ZB: I’ve always thought that Shias were more educated and civilised, less of a risk. But that doesn’t seem to be the case.
SH: Actually, because of Iran’s strategic goals, the meaning of jihad for them is different. While they wait for the Mahdi, they interpret jihad as a way to extend their influence. Since Khomeini, and even more now, they’ve shifted from waiting for the Imam to actively paving the way for his arrival. This means converting people to Shia Islam and extending their influence, which has led to war crimes and demographic changes in places like Syria and Iraq.
ZB: You wrote a fantastic piece for Quillette, about Twelver Shi’ism and their very interesting beliefs.
Pierre James
SH: Thank you. The Twelvers believe in waiting for the Mahdi, but now they’re interpreting jihad differently. They aren’t just waiting; they’re actively paving the way by converting others to Shia Islam. This has led to significant changes, including war crimes and genocide against small Sunni groups. As Iran extends its influence, it gains more power, which is their ultimate goal.
ZB: From your interviews with jihadis, I’m really interested in what jihadis who came from the West had to say. Were they different from those who grew up in the Middle East?
SH: They are different, but we’ll soon publish something about this in my dissertation. Generally, Western jihadis have different stories from locals and Arabs, and they are often more dangerous.
ZB: I look forward to your dissertation. In the meantime, what can governments like Australia, the US, Canada, and the UK do to prevent radicalisation at home?
SH: The media is a huge concern, especially Arabic media.
ZB: Say more about that—about Al Jazeera. I know that Al Jazeera in Arabic and Al Jazeera in English are very different.
SH: Yes, exactly. We also need to pay attention to Twitter. One of the things that upsets me is that militias have accounts on Twitter.
ZB: Do you think they should be banned?
SH: Absolutely. They are very risky, especially when it comes to recruiting, particularly for Iraqi militias. If you look at Lebanese and Iraqi Twitter, it’s all against Israel, all against Jews. Since October 7th, the narrative has revolved entirely around anti-Jewish sentiment. This is a red flag because they are recruiting online. Why does Twitter give them the platform to recruit people? I’m very concerned about online recruitment, and YouTube is also a big part of this.
ZB: Which is strange because YouTube can be quite strict. I’ve had videos demonetised for swearing or briefly showing a gun, yet in other languages, it might not be as sensitive.
SH: Yes, there are hundreds of YouTube videos promoting jihad and calling for violence. Just type “Ascalon” or “Gaza” in Arabic, and you’ll see a flood of videos, all against Jews, with thousands of views. This is very risky. Sometimes I watch them to understand what they’re saying, and it’s scary—it’s a constant call for jihad.
ZB: So do you think governments are doing enough? It sounds like they’re not.
SH: No, they’re not. If these accounts are still on Twitter, it’s not a good sign.
ZB: That’s concerning.
SH: I’m not sure how they could counter this narrative or block these accounts. It’s a specialised job, but online recruiting is very dangerous.
ZB: Do you have any statistics or knowledge about how many people are converting to Islam in the West? I’ve seen anecdotes of white women and men converting to Islam. They start wearing the hijab, going to mosques, and fully embracing the religion. They call themselves “reverts,” not “converts.”
SH: Yes, one of the narratives used by Hamas and Shia groups is about returning to the truth, which for them means Islam. They believe that only Islam holds the truth, which may explain the use of the term “revert.”
ZB: What do you think about young people in the West, especially on campuses, who support the Palestinians? There’s a spectrum—some people seem quite innocent in their support, just wanting good things for the Palestinians and feeling sorry for them. But then there are others who, like in Sydney over the weekend, were holding up a photo of Ismail Haniyeh, openly supporting these people as martyrs and heroes. What would you say to them?
SH: I would say, be careful of the manipulation by Hamas because they are using you as tools to mobilise people. You need to understand what the real people of Gaza want, and it’s not what Hamas wants. The true needs of the people—peace, respect for other religions—have been stolen by Hamas. They are using religion, women, and children, sacrificing them by putting them on the front lines. You need to ask yourself, if Hamas is holding the truth and defending Gaza, why do they shed so much blood and hide in tunnels? Why are they still alive while using hostages, keeping them from their families? Think about what would have happened if Hamas hadn’t started this conflict in the first place.
ZB: But to play devil’s advocate, people might say, “Suha, this didn’t start on October 7th. Israel has been treating Palestinians terribly for decades. We don’t necessarily agree with the violence, hostage-taking, rape, and murder, but Israel has been really bad to them.”
SH: Let’s go back and compare. Comparison is important. Let’s look at how people lived before and after October 7th and decide which was better. Before, people were going to school, college, even defending their Masters and PhD theses. Life wasn’t perfect, but it was better than now, where people have lived in darkness for months. And why is that? What is the result? It’s all for Hamas’s own goals.
ZB: Can you talk a little about Qatar and the role it plays in this?
SH: Qatar’s role is very vague. They manipulate the media and the narrative. Do they really want peace or to help the people of Gaza? I don’t think so. They send different messages in English and Arabic. In Arabic, they often spread hate against Israel. What they truly want—whether it’s power or blackmailing other countries—is very confusing.
ZB: And why do they host Hamas leaders there? Are they controlled by Iran?
SH: I’m not sure if they’re controlled by Iran. I would say it’s a win-win situation for them. They play a double role, helping here and there. It’s unclear whether they align with Iran, the United States, or others. Their use of Al Jazeera to tell different stories adds to the confusion.
ZB: In Australia, some of our biggest news stations have a relationship with Al Jazeera, where it’s syndicated on public TV. We pay taxes that go towards providing Al Jazeera. I have an issue with that.
SH: We need to consider whether Al Jazeera really wants peace or if they are creating more jihadist groups. If you look back at Iraq in 2003, Al Jazeera was broadcasting 24/7, much like Al Qaeda and other jihadist groups, spreading victimisation and shame, calling for jihad. They featured Al Qaradawi regularly, calling for the liberation of Iraqi women from the US. This constant victimisation narrative is similar to what we see now.
ZB: When I was in high school, ISIS, or ISIL, was the biggest terrorist group in the media. It was terrifying to see those images of beheadings. There seemed to be a period where we weren’t as scared, but after October 7th, it feels like that era of jihad and terrorism might be back. Would you agree?
SH: ISIS brought people to Iraq and Syria to create a state, drawing people from all over the world. Hamas is different—they’re already established and spreading the idea of jihad outward. We need to distinguish between their approaches. Hamas doesn’t need to build a state; they already have one. Their narrative is, “We are here, but Israel wants to displace us.”
The big difference is how they use women and children. When ISIS killed Muslim women and children, people hated them. But Hamas uses women and children as human shields against an external enemy, which some people accept. This is why I always say we shouldn’t mix Hamas with ISIS; they operate differently, and we need to understand how jihad is being shaped by each group.
ZB: I’ve heard a few dissidents—Palestinians who are truly pro-peace—say they don’t like Hamas and don’t support them. But studies show that people in Gaza do support Hamas. And with the hatred of Jews written in the Quran multiple times, how can we have peace when it’s part of the religion to hate Jews?
SH: We need to help people differentiate between a text written 1,400 years ago and the present day. The Quran tells ancient stories, but there’s nothing that obligates people to act against Jews or Christians today. If we understand how Hamas and Iran manipulate these narratives and rephrase ancient texts, we can tell people that these stories are historical, not prescriptive.
ZB: There are violent parts of the Hebrew Bible too, but only a very small minority of Christians and Jews take those literally or want to enact them today.
SH: Based on my reading, when modern scholars from places like Egypt or Lebanon interpret these texts, they rephrase them rather than rewrite them. They don’t say, “This is ancient, let’s move on.” They maintain that stoning or denying gay rights is still valid. We need scholars, like those from Al Azhar, to correct these texts and promote coexistence. We need a new fiqh, a new interpretation that respects the rights of women and others. For example, as a Muslim woman, I’ve always protested against the lack of rights—no right to marry by yourself, no right to lead, no inheritance rights. These injustices are what led me to study this issue deeply. We need to correct these ideas, like the requirement to wear a hijab, and allow women to choose.
ZB: Are you still a practising Muslim?
SH: I study Islam with interest, but...
ZB: That’s okay, you don’t have to answer. It’s very interesting, and if we had more time, I’d love to hear more about your experiences growing up in Iraq and moving to the States. But unfortunately, we’re almost out of time. Is there anything else you’d like to add?
SH: No, thank you for having me. Hopefully, I’ll contribute to Quillette again in the future.
ZB: Your piece with Pierre James was really fabulous. Thank you for the extremely important work you do.
