On 28 February, Israel and the United States began joint military operations to dismantle what remains of Iran’s nuclear program and topple the country’s revolutionary regime. 

Hannah Gal spoke to Israeli researcher and former intelligence officer Shmuel Bar for Quillette to discuss these historic developments. The following interview covers the changing geopolitical map, the likelihood of Iran’s fragmentation, what the future holds for the Middle East, and why future negotiations are now off the table.

This interview has been edited for clarity and length.

Quillette: Your PhD is in Middle Eastern studies but you are the founder of a company dealing with artificial intelligence.

Shmuel Bar: Our technology tries to overcome the conventional tendency to analyse strategic developments that could be turning points. This tendency prefers the “it hasn’t happened before therefore it is not likely to happen” interpretation of events. In lieu of this, we prefer to pose the questions that could reveal if and when we are on the cusp of a watershed event, and if something that did not happen before is about to happen. We try to ask not “What is happening now?” but rather “How do events that may seem disconnected merge and create second-order and third-order events that form the future?” The questions to ask are: “Where are we going? Where does all of this lead?” If events A, B, C, or D happen now, they may lead to E and F, both of which will lead to G in another year or two.

Q: The current conflict with Iran has been a long time coming. Netanyahu has been warning of Iran’s nuclear capabilities for over three decades.

SB: Iran is a case of imperial overextension. In an attempt to reach its imperialist goals, a country may attempt to achieve political and military influence in too many places at once. Iran achieved its status as a regional superpower by presenting power and capabilities that turned out to be far greater than what it actually had. The disclosure of the regime’s actual capabilities began when Israel confronted Iran directly after 7 October 2023. Since Hezbollah—Iran’s “crown jewel”—was firing rockets into northern Israel on Iran’s orders, Israel began to attack Iranian targets, first in Syria and then in Iran itself. Iran found itself in a dilemma: either retaliating extensively or refraining from retaliation would expose its weakness. 

The exposure of Iran’s basic weakness was the result of a domino effect. The Assad regime in Syria, Hamas in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Iranian proxies in Syria and Iraq were all instruments of Iran’s regional power. Hamas was severely degraded by the Israeli response to 7 October, an attack that turned out to be counterproductive for Hamas. The Houthis were severely hit by Israel and the US. Hezbollah’s leadership suffered a devastating blow after the Israeli “beeper attack” in September 2024 and subsequent air strikes. And then, in December, the Syrian regime was replaced by a regime that sees Iran as its enemy, also further weakening Hezbollah.

Iran viewed the Syrian regime as an important part of its strategic alignment, but it did not take into account—like many international intelligence communities—that the Assad regime was flimsy; it was propped up by Iran and the Russians and it did not really rule all of Syria. Once the Russians became busy with Ukraine and Iran seemed weaker, the Syrian regime was ripe fruit for its opposition. Israel then humiliated Iran in the June 2025 Twelve Day War, and the facade of a strategic regional superpower collapsed.

It is important to ask how this decline in Iran’s regional status is affecting its own domestic situation under circumstances of economic crisis, hyperinflation, and water shortages. The regime sent a message to its opposition that it is strong enough to deter and frighten America, Israel, and Britain etc, so its population should also be afraid of it, too. Domestic deterrence partly derives from regional and international deterrence, so the January protests were inevitable once Iran’s regional position weakened.

Q: People are trying to figure out the potential scenarios at hand. Trump is determined to avoid a long war of attrition, while Netanyahu might insist on continuing until all stated goals are met. Is the primary aim of both parties to destroy Iran’s nuclear capabilities?

SB: First, Iran could develop a destructive capability against Israel even without nuclear weapons. Israel will not accept this. So Israel had to take advantage of Iran’s weakness to eliminate Iran’s conventional capabilities. Second, the Iranian economy is in hyperinflation, people in big cities like Tehran, Isfahan, and Mashhad have about two or three hours of water a day. When you buy bread, the shop can’t buy a new loaf because the price of tomorrow’s bread has already gone up by twenty percent. There simply isn’t the money so the stores are empty.

So what are Iranians going to do if they don’t go out on to the streets to protest the state of the economy? They are saying, “Look at what you’ve done to us, you are throwing your money into Hamas and nuclear missiles instead of feeding us.” You have a deteriorating economy caught in a downward spiral, and a situation where Israel has a vested interest in getting rid of your missiles. And the June 2025 war showed that Israel knows a thing or two about what’s going on in Iran, and how to take out its senior figures.

As for Trump, it is probably best to avoid newspaper-like analysis that asks what he is doing today or tomorrow. Trump is saying, “Iran is weak and the Iranian people want to get rid of the regime, so all I have to do is push.” Let’s not forget that the regime has been chanting “Death to America!” for 47 years, and that it has murdered Americans. So from Trump’s point of view, he is taking revenge for all that and getting rid of a regime that the Democrats before him failed to remove. The way he sees it is: “In the end, I will have destroyed the most anti-American regime and made the Arab countries beholden to me as a result.” That is a win-win for Trump.

Q: Is there room for further negotiation with regards to nuclear capabilities?