As he is palpably changing America, President Trump is also trying to restructure the Middle East, perhaps as radically as Britain and France did in the wake of World War One. But so far, he has little to show for his efforts, and many local observers believe that the region is headed for a potentially catastrophic explosion next year.

Until now, Trump’s only real successes have been the imposition of two ceasefires—between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza War, which began when the Palestinian Islamists attacked southern Israel on 7 October 2023, and between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah, which had been rocketing Israel since 8 October 2023 in solidarity with Hamas. That first ceasefire, which is still holding, has seen Hamas release the remaining Israeli hostages it kidnapped on 7 October in exchange for some 2,000 Palestinians from Israeli prisons and the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from forward positions in the Strip to a “yellow” line bisecting the Strip, which consists of 365 sq. km or 141 sq. miles. This has left 53 percent of the minuscule territory in Israeli hands and the remainder in the hands of Hamas.

According to the 2o-point peace plan Trump announced last month, an “interim” Palestinian government and an “international” military/police “stabilisation” force (ISF), both nominally supervised by an ill-defined multilateral “Board of Peace,” was now supposed to disarm Hamas and “demilitarise” the Strip as the IDF gradually withdrew to a “perimeter” along the old Israel-Gaza border. Then, with funds from oil-rich Arab states, the international community was to begin reconstructing the Strip’s infrastructure and housing, mostly destroyed in Israel’s two-year-long air and ground campaign against the Hamas terrorists.

The plan also vaguely envisioned the establishment of a Palestinian “state” somewhere down the road. (Though France, Canada, Belgium, Britain, and other countries “recognised” that state last September, it is difficult to see how it will become a reality anytime soon.) Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu had initially hoped that the unfolding process would be accompanied by the resettlement of many of Gaza’s 2.3 million impoverished and traumatised inhabitants in foreign lands. Extreme right-wing Israelis hoped that Jews would begin settling in the Strip’s vacated spaces.

But none of this is happening. The Arab inhabitants don’t want to go anywhere and/or are not being allowed out by Hamas and Egypt, which controls the Strip’s southwestern border. Even if they were able to leave, no country—Arab or otherwise—is willing to take them in. Last week, about 150 Gazans, secretly marshalled by Israel and the US, landed in Johannesburg airport without visas. After spending twelve hours in the plane, they were given temporary asylum by the South African authorities. Last May, about fifty Gazans were similarly clandestinely transferred to the Far East. But these are drops in the ocean.

Hamas, meanwhile, has resolutely proclaimed that it will not disarm and its armed fighters continue to patrol the streets and marketplaces, demonstrating its intention to govern the Strip. Israel refuses to fully withdraw from the Strip or allow its reconstruction unless Hamas disarms and hands over governance to unspecified “others.” (The Netanyahu government has so far declined to divulge who.) Netanyahu continues to veto the admission of the West Bank-based Palestinian Authority forces into the Strip and the eventual establishment of a Palestinian state.

The Trump Administration, despite strenuous efforts, has been unable to establish an “interim” Arab administration or recruit Arab states willing to send troops/police to man the ISF. The main problem is that countries—especially Arab countries—are unwilling to contribute forces willing and able to confront and disarm Hamas. Despite its heavy losses in the war, Hamas is still armed to the teeth and in firm control of some 85 percent of the Strip’s population, who either support it or are cowed by its brutal behaviour (in recent weeks, Hamas fighters have executed or knee-capped hundreds of local opponents). Anyone trying to disarm Hamas or “demilitarise” the Strip—that is, destroy Hamas’s underground tunnel network and its stockpiles of munitions and weapons—will immediately be branded Israeli “collaborators” by Hamas and much of the Arab world. So far, the only country hinting that it is willing to send troops is (Muslim) Indonesia, but Jakarta is speaking of humanitarian assistance and “peace-keeping,” not taking on or disarming Islamist gunmen.

Netanyahu’s Israel, still living in the shadow of the worst disaster suffered by the Jewish people since the Holocaust, continues to insist that it will “destroy Hamas” and prevent its resurrection as a force capable of attacking Israel and governing the Strip. Some Israelis hope that Hamas misbehaviour in the coming months will provide an opportunity to renew the war and “finish the job.” But most Israelis—including war-weary IDF reservists—are not eager to restart the war, which ended in a type of stalemate. In general, an exhausted Israeli public has tired of the war and the world has tired—and worse—of Israel, so Israeli initiation of a new war is highly unlikely.

Furthermore, Trump is adamantly opposed to a renewal of hostilities, and Washington is now quietly floating a scheme that offers a way out of the current impasse, at least in the short term. Hamas will be allowed to continue to rule the 47 percent of the Strip it controls, including much-devastated Gaza City and the cluster of “camps” (in reality towns) in the Strip’s centre (al-Bureij, Nuseirat, al-Maghazi, and Deir al Balah). And reconstruction of infrastructure and housing will begin in the 53 percent of the territory under IDF control, starting with the town of Rafah at the southwestern end of the Strip. The ISF, if established, would deploy in these areas, police them, and orchestrate the distribution of humanitarian aid to the 200,000–300,000 Gazans living in the Israel-occupied area. Once Rafah and other such sites are rebuilt and repopulated (and this will take years and billions of dollars) the IDF would gradually withdraw and local non-Hamas Gazans would take over the administration. Meanwhile, the ISF, by its mere presence, would severely inhibit Israel’s ability to strike at Hamas. Presumably, Gazans would wish to move to these reconstructed sites from the areas controlled by Hamas, but it is unclear how Hamas would react were they to attempt to do so.

How Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey, the so-called Muslim mediators, will fit into this scheme is as yet unresolved. Turkey and Qatar are both long-time supporters of Hamas, and (although they do not say so openly) they seek the re-establishment of Islamist rule throughout the Strip. They will no doubt give Hamas political cover and surreptitiously help to re-arm its battered battalions. Yet Trump appears to want both Turkey and Qatar involved as major players in the “new” Gaza Strip. He certainly sees Qatar as a major financial contributor to the reconstruction effort and has repeatedly described the Islamist Turkish president, Erdogan, as a “friend.” Ankara, for its part, is eager to project Turkish power regionally by contributing troops to the ISF and involving its construction and infrastructure companies in the rebuilding operation. There is, after all, a great deal of money to be made reconstructing Gaza. But Israel opposes Turkish participation, and especially rejects any Turkish military presence in the Strip. So, behind the scenes a serious tussle between Jerusalem and Washington is ongoing. And, in this tug-of-war, Egypt’s president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, a long-time foe of Erdogan, is aligned with Israel. He hopes that Egyptian companies will take the lead in the reconstruction effort.

But Trump’s geopolitical vision encompasses the whole of the Middle East. Under Washington’s aegis, he hopes to fashion a solid bloc of moderate Sunni Muslim states as a counterweight to Shi’ite Iran’s hegemonic regional ambitions. At the moment, much of Washington’s energy is focused on Lebanon. There, like Israel, Trump hopes to defang the local Shi’ite Hezbollah militia, a powerful Iranian proxy that effectively controlled Lebanese politics for some two decades. Hezbollah’s dominance came to an abrupt end in summer/autumn 2024, when Israel went over to the offensive and badly mauled the organisation, degrading its military formations and armouries and annihilating much of its leadership.

In November, at Hezbollah’s pleading, Washington mediated an Israeli–Hezbollah ceasefire. Its terms included the withdrawal of Hezbollah forces from the Israeli border and the organisation’s eventual disarmament; the deployment of the Lebanese Army in southern Lebanon to assure Hezbollah compliance; and eventual IDF withdrawal from Lebanon. All of this was supposed to occur under international supervision. But Hezbollah has refused to disarm and has only partially withdrawn from southern Lebanon. The Lebanese Army, with many Shi’ites in its ranks, has refrained from seriously challenging the Islamists, fearing that clashes could spiral into a new Lebanese civil war (the last one, between 1975 and 1991, cost hundreds of thousands of Lebanese lives). So Israel has maintained five border-hugging strong points in southern Lebanon and has periodically attacked Hezbollah personnel, positions, and arms depots. Israel estimates that it has killed some 400 Hezbollah fighters and officials since last November.

These attacks have intensified in recent weeks, and Hezbollah has not retaliated once so far. But last week, the organisation’s leader, Na’im Qassem, publicly vowed to respond, saying that the organisation and its “honour” could no longer abide the situation. Retaliation would likely trigger major IDF counterstrikes, and many Israelis believe that Israel should use the opportunity to destroy Hezbollah, who share the eliminationist goals of Hamas and Iran vis-à-vis Israel. But most Israeli commentators believe that “destroying” Hezbollah—which is deeply rooted in Lebanon’s large Shi’ite population and has personnel and arms depots scattered across the country—is beyond Israel’s military and political capabilities. 

Although Hezbollah has been much weakened, it remains a major component of the Shi’ite “ring of fire” that Iran constructed around Israel over the past three decades. That ring also included Syria (ruled until December 8 by the Shi’ite Alawite Assad regime), the Houthi rebels in Yemen, and Shi’ite militias in Iraq as well as—somewhat paradoxically—Sunni Hamas in Gaza. These proxies projected and amplified Iranian power around the Middle East, threatening Sunni Arab states and regional American interests as well as Israel. In the past two years of war-making, Israel broke the back of the proxy encirclement and, in its successful twelve-day June aerial offensive against Iran, it brought low the ayatollahs in Tehran, demolishing Iran’s air defences, degrading its ballistic-missile capabilities and, with America’s assistance, seriously damaging its nuclear-weapons program. (Trump foolishly halted the Israeli offensive mid-way, and even forced Netanyahu to recall dozens of jets in mid-flight on their way to hit Iranian government installations on day twelve.)

Iran is a nation of 100 million people with vast oil reserves and a large military. It remains a constant threat, and one now harbouring powerful vengeful passions. Israel and America have both vowed that they will not allow Iran to acquire nuclear weaponry. But Iran has so far refused to enter into negotiations with Washington about its nuclear program. Indeed, Jerusalem and Washington suspect that Tehran is secretly renewing the program and it has refused, since June, to allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials to inspect its facilities.

An Uneasy Peace

Trump’s peace plan brings the hostages home and halts fighting in Gaza, but Hamas’s refusal to disarm and Israeli concerns about Palestinian statehood threaten the deal’s long-term survival.

QuilletteBenny Morris

But from Israel’s perspective, the Iranian threat is not limited to potential nuclear weaponry. In last June’s mini-war, Iran showered Israel with powerful ballistic missiles. Israel’s sophisticated anti-missile defences shot down 85 percent of these, but the remaining fifteen percent caused enormous damage, including to vital Israeli installations. Now, with North Korean (and possibly Chinese and Russian) aid, Iran is energetically rebuilding its ballistic-missile capabilities and air defences. The Islamic Republic’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, recently announced that its missile capabilities now surpass what it possessed last June and the country is said to be developing improved—and even hypersonic—missiles. At the same time, Israel’s stock of anti-ballistic missile interceptors was severely depleted in the June fighting. Netanyahu and various Israeli commentators have recently said that if Israel is to avoid being overwhelmed by Iranian rocketry, it may need to repeat its aerial campaign against Iran in the near future.

On the positive side, it appears that Syria is now on its way to joining the emergent anti-Iranian American-led alliance. Syria’s president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, last week visited Washington and was hailed by President Trump as a new friend, “a tough guy,” and a “very strong leader.” “I like him,” said the American president, who announced that America would be lifting more sanctions and re-opening the two countries’ embassies in their respective capitals.

But al-Sharaa refused to commit to joining the Trump-sponsored Abraham Accords, which saw four Arab states normalise relations with the Jewish state in 2020, and so far Syria and Israel have failed to sign a “security” agreement governing their future relations. After the al-Sharaa-led Islamist takeover last December, the Israeli air force destroyed most of the Assad regime’s air bases, aircraft, advanced armour and artillery, chemical weapons depots and missile boats. IDF ground forces also occupied the north–south buffer zone between the Golan Heights and Syria and began mounting patrols in southeastern Syria proper in an effort to prevent Islamist gunmen from approaching Israeli territory. Al-Sharaa is demanding that Israel withdraw from the territory it occupied after 8 December 2024 and cease patrolling the areas to the east, arguing that this is sovereign Syrian territory. But Israel is wary and many Israelis are wondering if a leopard can change its spots.

By “leopard” they mean al-Sharaa. In his not-so-distant previous incarnation, al-Sharaa (nom-de-guerre Abu Muhammad al-Julani) was a senior figure in al Qaeda, the multi-pronged terrorist organisation that toppled New York’s twin towers in 2001. His family are from the Golan Heights (hence “al-Julani”) but he was born in Saudi Arabia. As a young jihadist, he fought the Americans in Iraq and was imprisoned there during 2006–11. He then moved to Syria as the newly-appointed local leader of “al Qaeda in Iraq,” which soon became the Islamic State of Iraq (later the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or ISIS). Al-Sharaa called his Syrian network the Nusra Front, which carried out terrorist attacks on Syria’s and Lebanon’s Shi’ite, Alawite, Christian, and Druze communities during 2012–16. The US put a US$10 million bounty on his head.

But al-Sharaa gradually struck out independently, serially severing his relations with ISIS “caliph” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and with al Qaeda’s global network, led by Ayman al Zawahiri, the successor to Osama bin Laden. Abu Ali al-Anbari, one of al-Baghdadi’s aides, deemed al-Sharaa “cunning and two faced.” Rumours circulated in Syria that information provided to the US by al-Sharaa had helped special forces raid al-Baghdadi’s Idlib hideaway in October 2019 leading to the “caliph’s” death. Once ensconced in Damascus and removed from America’s list of wanted terrorists, al-Sharaa promised to protect Syria’s minorities. But his Nusra Front militiamen and other Islamist gunmen went on to slaughter 1,600 Alawites in Latakia Province and hundreds of Druze “infidels” in and around Suweida in southeastern Syria. Is the now freshly suited al-Sharaa a lamb or a leopard? And can he be trusted?

Trump appears to think he can. After their meeting last week, Trump announced that al-Sharaa had now joined the American-led coalition against ISIS (a fairly innocuous promise as ISIS is no longer a major player or threat). But Israel is less sure and, in part to assuage its own Druze community—whose sons serve in the IDF – Israel has promised to protect the Syrian Druze, clustered around Suweida and Jabl Druze (the Mount of the Druze) and has provided them with arms and ammunition. 

Last week, al-Sharaa told the Washington Post that “to reach a final agreement, Israel should withdraw to their pre-Dec. 8 borders.” For its part, Israel demands that Syria agree to complete “demilitarisation” of the area south and southeast of Damascus so that Israel need not fear Islamist gunmen moving into the area. Al-Sharaa also dismissed the possibility of Syria joining the Abraham Accords for the time being. And he referred to the Golan Heights, which Israel conquered from the Syrians in the 1967 Six-Day War, and which Israel has since settled with 31,000 Jews (alongside the 24,000 indigenous Druze inhabitants). Although the US has recognised this land as sovereign Israeli territory, Syria still wants it back.

But southeastern Syria is only one part of the unstable Middle East powder keg. Another, connected to Syria, is Turkey. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has compared Netanyahu to “Hitler” and occasionally called for Israel’s destruction, patronised al-Sharaa in the years before 8 December and helped him topple the Assad regime. Today, he is busy arming and training the new Islamist Syrian army. Hakan Fidan, the Turkish foreign minister, reportedly took part in some of al-Sharaa’s meetings last week with Trump and other administration officials, underlining the Damascus–Ankara connection.

Israel has warned Ankara and Damascus that it will not countenance Turkish troops anywhere near its borders. In September, Israeli aircraft bombed warehouses near Homs that reportedly contained advanced Turkish air-defence equipment, and the previous month, Israeli commandos dismantled Turkish espionage equipment in a base in al-Kiswah near Damascus. Israeli officials have said that Israel will not allow Turkey to curtail Israeli freedom in Syria’s skies (which Israeli aircraft daily traversed last June in their offensive against Iran). 

Finally, there is Saudi Arabia, the keystone in Trump’s envisioned anti-Iranian Sunni arch. Later this week, Muhammad Bin Salman (or “MBS,” as he is fondly known in Washington), the Saudi crown prince and effective ruler of the giant kingdom, will meet with Trump in the White House. Amid the expected pomp and ceremony, the two leaders are likely to conclude a mutual security pact, with the United States promising the Saudis 48 advanced F-35 stealth fighters and, possibly, help in setting up nuclear plants in the desert in return for many billions of dollars.

From Israel’s perspective both items are problematic. A nuclear Saudi Arabia, even if only envisioned as a counter to Iran’s nuclear ambitions, might be tempted to launch its own atomic weapons program. And other states, like Turkey and Egypt, might be tempted to follow suit. The fear of nuclear proliferation in the ever-volatile Middle East is not restricted to Israel. But the F-35s are of more immediate concern, although it usually takes six years between agreement signature and actual delivery of the planes. The US has long guaranteed Israel’s military “qualitative edge”—by law, following a congressional resolution—over its actual or potential Muslim/Arab foes. F-35s—which spearheaded Israel’s June assault on Iran with striking success—in Saudi hands would jeopardise that advantage; and there is no guarantee that Saudi Arabia, the heartland of Islam and traditionally an antisemitic state, will not one day join the Muslim-Arab rejectionist front. (Last year, Washington rescinded a promise to sell the United Arab Emirates F-35s, partly because of Israeli pressure. A few years earlier, it rescinded an F-35 contract with Turkey after Turkey purchased advanced Russian anti-aircraft missile systems. Some American officials oppose the sale of the F-35s to the Saudis, fearing that the plane’s secrets may be leaked to China, which has a security pact with Riyadh.)

Over the past few years, Israel and the Saudis have had secret contacts and Trump has repeatedly pressed Riyadh to join the Abraham Accords. The Saudis linked possible accession to Israel announcing that it would agree to open the way to eventual Palestinian statehood. Netanyahu was reluctant to make such a promise but MBS seemed, however hesitantly, to be moving toward such an accommodation. Then the Hamas massacred 1,250 Israelis on 7 October 2023 and the Israelis counter-attacked, killing thousands of Palestinians, Hamasniks as well as civilians. With the opinions of other Arab states and their own public in mind, the Saudis declined to sign a deal with Israel. The Israeli government, which has publicised its opposition to the Saudi acquisition of nuclear energy (why does the oil-rich kingdom need it anyway?) and F-35s, is busy pressing Trump to make such sales conditional on the Saudis joining the Abraham Accords.

For now, the position of the Israeli government appears to be that it can (reluctantly) live with Saudi F-35s and a nuclearised kingdom (though without Riyadh receiving the full Uranium enrichment package), but only if MBS makes peace with the Jewish state. However, Saudi officials have recently said that Saudi Arabia will not join the accords. Many of Trump’s aides are sympathetic to the Israeli position but what Trump will do remains to be seen. In all likelihood, unfolding events on Israel’s borders and in Iran will affect Washington’s and Riyadh’s decision-making.