Last Saturday, 29 March, as my family and I were sitting on a grassy patch in the foothills of Judea, celebrating a birthday, we could hear the occasional loud booms of Israeli bombs hitting the Gaza Strip, some thirty kilometres to the southwest. Israel’s latest bombing campaign, which began on 18 March with a widespread 400-target strike against Hamas that apparently killed dozens of civilians as well as key figures in the terrorist organisation, constituted a violation of the Israeli–Hamas ceasefire deal reached on 17 January, which temporarily halted the war that Hamas launched on 7 October 2023, which had been raging for fifteen months at that point.

The ceasefire deal was designed to ensure the release of the hostages Hamas abducted from Israel on 7 October in exchange for the release of thousands of captured Palestinian fighters from Israeli prisons together with an end to the war and to the IDF’s partial occupation of the Gaza Strip. But after a series of limited hostage/prisoner exchanges over the previous few months, the Israeli cabinet, with American support, decided to renege on the agreement and now refuses to end the war until Hamas’s leaders have gone into exile, and the organisation has been dismantled and disarmed and has ceded control of Gaza’s population centres—either to Israel or to an as yet unnamed international peacekeeping force. Netanyahu hopes that Gaza’s Arabs will then “voluntarily” quit the Strip, in line with President Donald Trump’s publicly announced “transfer” proposal for resolving the conflict. Hamas’s attempts to drag its feet on a hostage/prisoner exchange deal in order to prolong the ceasefire proved unsuccessful.

Following the surprise 7 October Hamas assault, in which 1,200 Israelis were murdered, most of them civilians, and 251 further Israelis, most of whom were likewise civilians, were abducted to Gaza, the Israeli cabinet announced that its primary goal was to utterly destroy Hamas. Days later, almost as an afterthought, the cabinet added that the release of the abducted hostages was an additional war aim. Since then, massive, continual street demonstrations by the friends and families of the hostages and their supporters, and pressure from President Trump, have forced the release of the hostages to the top of the government’s declared agenda. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, however, clearly continues to view the destruction of Hamas as the over-riding war aim. This is partly because of a sense of personal betrayal—in the months leading up to 7 October, he was duped by Hamas tactics and rhetoric into believing that the Palestinian Islamist organisation had been “neutralised” and no longer aimed at achieving Israel’s destruction, at least in the short term. In addition, for Netanyahu, this is also a matter of securing his place in history: he refuses to be remembered as someone who lost to a bunch of terrorist thugs.

But after fifteen months of Israeli bombing and the occupation of large parts of the Strip by IDF ground forces, Hamas is still standing and has replaced its estimated 20,000 dead fighters with new Gazan recruits. Thousands of the Strip’s young men have been only too ready to take up arms for Hamas after their homes and families were devastated by the Israeli counter-offensive—especially given the cash payments Hamas doles out to new recruits.

Netanyahu has explained this month’s renewed bombing campaign, coupled with the return of IDF ground troops to Beit Lahiya in the north, to the Netzarim Corridor, which bisects the Strip in the centre, and parts of Rafah in the south, as a tactic designed to persuade Hamas to release the 59 remaining hostages (most of whom are believed to be dead), not a renewal of full-scale war. Netanyahu’s war options are seriously constricted by the growing indications that many IDF reservists, who have served 300–500 days in uniform over the past eighteen months, will simply not show up if called to serve again; many remain traumatised by their experiences, many have lost their civilian jobs or clientele, due to their extended service in the Strip or Lebanon, and some object to the government’s ongoing campaign to castrate the country’s judicial system and fire its legal gatekeepers (see below).

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But Netanyahu’s critics believe that the prime minister is still bent on achieving the government’s initial war aim and, in addition, by prolonging the war, hopes to help his government retain power for as long as possible. The war has certainly had the effect of causing Israelis to rally round the flag. Once the war ends, however, say the government’s critics, many Israelis will shift  to opposing Netanyahu and demand immediate general elections, in which Netanyahu and his right-wing and religious allies are projected to lose. They will also press for a state commission of inquiry into the failures of 7 October, for which Netanyahu is likely to be held chiefly responsible.

So far, Hamas has refused to bend to Netanyahu’s—and President Donald Trump’s—demands and release the remaining hostages but has refrained from responding to Israel’s military attacks in kind, aside from launching the odd, ineffectual rocket from Gaza towards Israel. Hamas is clearly reluctant to resume full-scale war, which might see the Strip completely over-run by IDF divisions, as Netanyahu has threatened.

Curiously, Hezbollah, Israel’s Islamist antagonist in Lebanon, has also held its fire—despite continuous Israeli attacks on its fighters—since the signing of the Israel–Hezbollah ceasefire deal on 27 November 2024. Hezbollah began rocketing northern Israel on 8 October 2023, in support of the Hamas offensive in the south. In September–October 2024, Israel launched a massive, highly effective counter-offensive, destroying most of Hezbollah’s rocket capabilities, killing and maiming thousands of its fighters, and assassinating its legendary leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah. As part of November’s ceasefire deal, Hezbollah agreed to withdraw its forces in southern Lebanon to areas north of the Litani river, away from the international border, and, by implication, to disarm and halt the resupply of arms from Iran via Syria. In exchange, Israel agreed to withdraw its invading troops from Lebanese soil, and the Lebanese government agreed to deploy its army to the areas in southern Lebanon evacuated by Hezbollah and the IDF. But none of the three parties involved have fully complied with the terms of the deal. Hezbollah has not disarmed, maintains some clandestine forces south of the Litani River, and continues its efforts to replenish its rocket stockpiles; some Israeli troops remain in five fortified positions in southern Lebanon, near the border with Israel, while Israeli jets occasionally strike Hezbollah fighters and weaponry in southern Lebanon; and the Lebanese army has neither fully deployed in the south of the country nor completely expelled Hezbollah elements from the area, let alone disarmed Hezbollah).

On Friday 28 March, in response to the launch of rockets from southern Lebanon towards Israel for the second time since the start of the ceasefire, the Israel Air Force flattened a building in Beirut’s Dahiya quarter, Hezbollah’s main stronghold. Israel’s cabinet ministers announced that henceforward, “what pertains to Israel’s border settlements will pertain to Beirut,” meaning that attacks on Israel’s border settlements would trigger Israeli attacks on the heart of Lebanon. The announcement, and the strike on Dahiya, represent a major shift in Israeli policy. Until summer 2024, the Jewish state responded to Hezbollah attacks on northern Israel with attacks on southern Lebanon and avoided targeting Beirut for fear of provoking Hezbollah retaliation against Tel Aviv and strategic targets deep in Israel. But since the IDF defanged Hezbollah last year, Israel apparently no longer fears the terrorist group or its potential ability to strike at central Israel.

Following the very precise attack on Dahiya, in which it seems that no one died, since Israel forewarned the Lebanese of the exact target of the impending attack, which housed Hezbollah drones, the government in Jerusalem announced that henceforward it would hold the Lebanese government responsible for any violation of the ceasefire. And, in a surprising acknowledgement of its weakness, Hezbollah announced that it would not retaliate, arguing that it is the Lebanese government’s responsibility to react to Israeli attacks on Lebanon. For its part, the Lebanese government condemned the Israeli attack but said it would investigate who was responsible for the rocket launches against Israel. Hezbollah had already denied responsibility for the rocket attacks—but Israeli sources claim that such attacks, even if not carried out by Hezbollah fighters, could not be carried out without that organisation’s consent.   

Meanwhile, under cover of the renewed, but so far low-key, warmaking in both the north and south, Netanyahu and his cabinet have pushed vigorously ahead with their efforts to “reform” the governance of the country—reforms that Netanyahu’s critics charge constitute a campaign to subvert Israel’s democratic system and neuter the country’s judiciary, especially the Supreme Court. Netanyahu’s ruling coalition controls the Knesset, holding 69 seats out of that chamber’s total of 120. Last week, the Knesset passed a law restructuring the committee responsible for appointing judges, including Supreme Court judges, so that appointments will in effect be controlled by the government representatives on the committee. The law is to go into effect after the next general elections. Critics warn that it would grant any ruling coalition in the Knesset effective control over the judiciary. Netanyahu has been on trial on corruption charges for the past five years and may be keen to demonstrate his power—indeed supremacy—over the “petty” enforcers of the law.

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Last week, Netanyahu announced that he intends to fire Ronen Bar, the head of Israel’s security service, Shin Bet. Although he was a Netanyahu appointee, Bar has long been a thorn in the prime minister’s side, opposing various government proposals and policies, especially with regard to the hostage/prisoner exchange negotiations that have taken place over the past eighteen months. Netanyahu’s minions have even been quietly disseminating the obvious lie that Bar knew about the impending Hamas October 7 attack but did nothing to try to prevent it. But the thing that really seems to stick in Bibi’s craw is Shin Bet’s ongoing investigation of three of his close aides for trying to whitewash the Qatar government: an affair known as “Qatargate.” Qatar  has been Hamas’s most prominent supporter in the Arab world for years. The aides, Jonathan Urich, Israel Einhorn, and Eli Feldstein, all apparently received substantial payments from Doha, on which they avoided paying income tax, and spearheaded a campaign to legitimise Qatar in Western eyes—despite the fact that over the years Qatar has given Hamas hundreds of millions of dollars. These funds were ostensibly designed to support civil projects—but the money was fungible and no doubt helped build Hamas’s military capabilities.

Netanyahu personally facilitated the transfer of the Qatari funds to Gaza and he, too, may have received money from Qatar. The prime minister believed that the Qatari subsidies would help appease Hamas and deter it from launching military strikes against Israel—attacks that would lead to suspension of the Qatari funding, so went the thinking. Netanyahu no doubt fears that the Shin Bet investigation will lead from the three suspects to himself—since it is unlikely that they would have engaged in the operation without his permission. This implies that Netanyahu directly facilitated the military empowerment of Hamas in the run-up to 7 October. Hence, his efforts to dismiss Bar and replace him with a Shin Bet chief loyal to himself.

But Bar enjoys the support of Attorney-General Gali Baharav-Miara, the government’s legal adviser, who has publicly informed the cabinet that she opposes Bar’s dismissal on a variety of technical grounds. Netanyahu has been trying to oust Baharav-Miara for months, mainly because she opposes the government’s efforts to enact a law legitimising the exemption of ultra-Orthodox youth from serving in the IDF. This law is still under debate and many of the Likud’s Knesset members oppose it, as, of course, do the opposition parties. If the bill does not pass, Netanyahu’s ultra-Orthodox allies may leave the ruling coalition, which would bring down the government.

Opposition parties have already appealed to the Supreme Court to halt Bar’s dismissal as a clear case of conflict of interests. Netanyahu, after all, is trying to fire the official who is leading the investigation into his activities and those of his aides. Everyone is now awaiting the court ruling. The court has ordered a halt to the government’s moves to remove Bar until it rules on the issue. The ruling is scheduled for 8 April, two days before Bar’s dismissal is supposed to come into effect. Meanwhile, tens of thousands of Israelis have been rallying in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and other sites around Israel this week, to protest against the government’s intransigence in the hostage/prisoner exchange negotiations, against the renewed attacks on Gaza—which, the protesters say, endanger any future hostage deal—and against Bar’s removal from office.

The combination of renewed fighting between Israel and Hamas, coupled with the Israeli government’s efforts to “reform” the country’s democratic structures, appears to be propelling Israel—and perhaps the wider Middle East—into uncharted, troubled waters. But in some ways it also represents history repeating itself. After all, it was the new Netanyahu government’s January 2023 announcement of “judicial reforms” that appears to have set Hamas and Hezbollah on the path that led them to launch their war against Israel the following October, in the belief that the resulting internal political fragmentation had militarily weakened the Jewish state.