When you type ‘social construction’ into Google Scholar, the drop-down autocomplete suggestions include ‘of gender,’ ‘of technology,’ ‘of race,’ and ‘of crime.’ All claims that something or other is socially constructed have in common that the thing does not exist outside of society. Had Homo sapiens never evolved, there would be no such thing as gender, technology, race, or crime. But this commonality can mask differences in what people are trying to get at when they invoke the idea of social construction, and that can lead to miscommunication and talking past one another. There are at least three distinct things that people might be trying to get at when they say that something is ‘socially constructed’: that it is social, rather than natural; that it is contextual, rather than universal; or that its importance has been artificially inflated.  

Social vs. natural. In a debate about gender at the Houston Institute, the philosopher Alex Byrne invokes the (purportedly actual) case of a man raised by wolves and living without any other humans. This man could not have been a police officer, an actor, or a politician, says Byrne, because these are all social categories that require individuals to be members of societies (and for these societies to have social practices of policing, theatre, and political office, respectively). But “that didn’t prevent him, surely, from being a boy and subsequently a man,” comments Byrne—and that shows us that ‘man’ is not a socially constructed category. If ‘man’ is a gender term, then gender is not socially constructed, despite Google Scholar’s helpful suggestion.

Contextual vs. universal. Some seven months later at MIT, in a debate about sex and gender identity, Alice Dreger (author of Galileo’s Middle Finger) argued that sex is a social construction, that “at different social moments we categorise sex differently depending on the social need.” In response to challenge, she asked, “When does sunrise happen? When does sunset happen? What we do is set a time on it based on where the light comes up. But we could just as well decide that we’re going to set sunset or sunrise based on the bottom of the sun as opposed to the top of the sun, right?”

There are facts of the matter here: the sun exists, light comes up. But we also make some decisions about those facts. We decide to use the top of the sun as our marker, and so declare the first appearance of light as the marker of sunrise, the last appearance of light as the marker of sunset. It is not fully up to us, because we only get to choose between different horizontal segments of the sun. But the mere fact that we exercise some discretion here is enough to show that the concepts ‘sunrise’ and ‘sunset’ are socially constructed. Perhaps the same is true of sex: there’s a fact of the matter, and (according to those who invoke this line of reasoning) that involves any or all of gametes, chromosomes, hormones, gonads, and genitals; but it’s up to us exactly which of these we care about and why. And which we care about and why might well change over time.

Inflated vs. deflated. This last type of social construction is probably the least understood, and yet it is perhaps the most important to discussions about sex and gender (and probably also to discussions about race—with skin colour and facial features taking the place of genital differences). There are some characteristics that are both natural and universal, and yet have been inflated socially and are now in the process of being deflated. Let me give two examples: one from Edward Stein’s 1999 book The Mismeasure of Desire, relating to the alleged social construction of sexual orientation, the other from Marilyn Frye’s 1983 book The Politics of Reality, relating to the alleged social construction of gender.

Example 1.

Imagine that you find yourself in the (imaginary) country of Zomnia. Zomnia is a place much like the one in which we live, but the human inhabitants of Zomnia are, unlike us, deeply interested in very particular details of each other’s sleep habits. Specifically, Zomnians are concerned with whether people sleep on their backs or on their stomachs: people who sleep on their backs are called “backers” and people who sleep on their stomachs are called “fronters.” The majority of people in Zomnia are thought to be fronters, and until recently there was explicit and prevalent discrimination against people known or suspected to be backers. I say “suspected” because most people who sleep on their backs do not publicize this fact and because most Zomnians think that they can tell a backer by sight. 

Example 2.

Imagine… A colony of humans established a civilization hundreds of years ago on a distant planet. … The language has personal pronouns marking the child/adult distinction, and its adult personal pronouns mark the distinction between straight and curly pubic hair. At puberty each person assumes distinguishing clothing styles and manners so others can tell what type she or he is without the closer scrutiny which would generally be considered indecent. People with straight pubic hair adopt a style which is modest and self-effacing and clothes which are fragile and confining; people with curly pubic hair adopt a style which is expansive and prepossessing and clothes which are sturdy and comfortable. … It is taboo to eat or drink in the same room with any person of the same pubic hair type as oneself. Compulsory heterogourmandism, it is called by social critics, though most people think it is just natural human desire to eat with one’s pubic hair opposite.

Stein, the author of the backers/fronters example, goes on to elaborate on the physical and behavioural markers by which Zomnians think they can identify a backer, and the research that has been done into the causes and explanations of backerism. He asks his readers what their reaction would be to all this, were they to visit Zomnia, and he says that, for his own part, “My reaction would be to tell them that their practice of grouping people into backers and fronters is laughable at best, their practice of discriminating against people on the basis of their sleep habits is morally wrong, and their scientific theories that concern the ‘etiology’ of ‘backerhood’ are pseudoscientific.”

Frye, the author of the curly/straight pubic hair example, includes a parallel to the medical/surgical treatment of people with differences of sexual development, supposing that people with ambiguous or intermediate pubic hair “alter their hair chemically,” and that “Since those with curly pubic hair have higher status and economic advantages, those with ambiguous pubic hair are told to make it straight,” since this is less likely to provoke retaliation if the ruse is discovered.

Lost Down Social Constructionism’s Epistemic Rabbit-Hole

Where they have raised both eyebrows and tempers among social constructionism’s growing number of critics.

QuilletteKåre Fog

That there are people who sleep on their backs and people who sleep on their fronts is a fact likely both natural and universal. So too for types of pubic hair. Even the man raised by wolves is likely to have a regular sleeping position. And his pubic hair will be either curly or straight (or ambiguous—these three options exhaust the logical possibilities). The examples are meant to show that there are differences between people that are both natural and universal, and yet are socially constructed in the sense that their meaning and significance is greatly exaggerated. There is a real difference between different sleep orientations, but it’s a stupid difference to care about. Likewise, pubic hair type is a real difference, but again, it’s a stupid difference to care about. We can apply the same principle to sexual orientation and sex/gender and ask: are these also real differences that it’s nevertheless stupid to care about?

Just as the people of Zomnia decided they could tell a backer just by looking and conducted research into the causes and explanations of backerism, some people think they can tell a gay man just by looking and conduct research into the causes and explanations of homosexuality. Just as trivial differences of pubic hair are magnified into differences of presentation and comportment on Frye’s distant planet, it may be that trivial differences in genitals are magnified into many of the currently observed sex differences. And just as Stein declared scientific theories of the alleged etiology of backerhood “pseudoscientific,” we might similarly declare scientific theories of the alleged etiology of (psychological) sex differences pseudoscientific. Gay and straight people, and men and women, are not different in any deep or interesting ways. They are different only in superficial and uninteresting ways that have been inflated to appear deep and interesting.

Transgenderism and the Social Construction of Diagnosis

Tannehill subsequently posted the article to the Facebook page of the World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH).

QuilletteLisa Marchiano

If we do not distinguish between these three possibilities when we declare something to be a social construction, and/or disagree about whether a thing is socially constructed, we risk miscommunicating. For Byrne may be right that a man raised by wolves is still a man and the feminists may be right that the wolf-man’s lack of masculine behaviour is evidence that gender is socially constructed (here the miscommunication concerns both what social construction is and whether ‘man’ is a sex or gender term). Dreger might be right that sex-as-chromosomes is a social construction, and her opponents might be right that sex is not socially constructed. And, finally, Stein and Frye might be right that sexual orientation and masculinity/femininity respectively are socially constructed, and yet their opponents who insist that there are real differences in sexual orientation and between the sexes might be right too.