On Monday 26 June 2023, in a soulless corporate boardroom in Kensington, I listened to Israeli commentator Ehud Yaari deliver a lecture on shifting alliances and threats in the Middle East. As a twenty-year-old student activist, it was the first time I had heard of the Axis of Resistance, a network of Iran-aligned groups that included Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, the Assad regime in Syria, and the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) in Iraq. “Iran’s Quds Force, led by Qasem Soleimani, recognised that Arab attempts to destroy Israel since 1948 failed due to a total lack of ideological and strategic coordination,” said Yaari. “Soleimani’s solution was simple. Build a network of allies around Israel’s borders and, when the time is right, squeeze.” I remember a pit forming in my stomach at the prospect of the engineered destruction of Israel, its citizens helpless against an unrelenting onslaught from all directions.

Few people in the pre-7 October world—Yaari included—could have imagined the attempted realisation of that dream by Hamas. Fewer still could have predicted that two years later, Lebanon would ban the IRGC and expel Iranian diplomats from its soil, while civil servants in London celebrated the legacy of the Islamic Revolution. Lebanese foreign minister Youssef Raggi has announced that the Iranian ambassador, Mohammad Reza Shibani, is now persona non grata in Lebanon. Hezbollah described the decision as a “grave strategic mistake” and a capitulation to foreign influence. Hours later, an Iranian ballistic missile struck Lebanon’s coastal region, making it the thirteenth country in the region to be targeted by Iran.

The Lebanese decision was a reaction to the humanitarian cost of Israel–Hezbollah fighting, which has displaced a million people as Israel attempts to take control of all Lebanese territory south of the Litani River. This follows previous attempts to curtail Shi’ite militancy: in early March, the Lebanese prime minister and former ICJ president Nawaf Salam vowed to ban Hezbollah’s military activities. This emerging campaign against Hezbollah from within the Lebanese political establishment is extraordinarily brave. Until early February, Lebanon’s security directorate was effectively controlled by Wafiq Safa, a notorious Hezbollah official linked to the arbitrary detention of anti-Hezbollah activists. It has also been reported that Lebanese parliamentary speaker Nabih Berri receives US$500,000 a month from the Islamic Republic to maintain Hezbollah’s stranglehold on national politics. The fight against Hezbollah is—and always has been—a very dangerous uphill battle.

Raggi’s announcement indicates that Lebanon is tired of being held hostage by Iranian terrorist actors; tired of seeing its citizens pay the price for the crimes of an unelected radical Shi’ite collective; and tired of being counted among nations known chiefly for their lack of progress. After a two-year vacancy, the country finally has a functioning presidency under Joseph Aoun, who recently affirmed his central ethos: “Lebanon cannot wage the wars of others on its soil.” Aoun recognises that in countries ravaged by the Axis of Resistance, foreign and domestic policies are one and the same—always under the lethal supervision of the IRGC. 

This is a direct affront to the Islamic Republic’s mission in Lebanon, best articulated by its ambassador in January 1984: “If we concentrate on the point that Lebanon is considered the heart of the Arab countries in the Middle East, a platform from which different ideas have been directed to the rest of the Arab world, we can conclude that the existence of an Islamic movement in that country will result in Islamic movements throughout the Arab world.” In that same vein, Lebanon’s growing rejection of Iranian interference serves as a test case for the wider region. As the axis collapses, the ensuing vacuum presents a genuine opportunity for post-regime advancement and integration, though one that will prove short-lived if leaders fail to seize it.

The decline of the Islamic Republic is a strategic catastrophe for organised jihadist militancy in the Middle East. As Hamas attempts to reassert control over Gaza, its political leadership is increasingly forced to balance competing loyalties to Iran and Qatar. Qatar has threatened to expel Hamas leaders from Doha should these tensions escalate further. Such threats are not new; they have been repeatedly employed by the Qatari regime as a tactic to pressure Hamas into concessions during hostage negotiations in the Israel–Hamas War. However, what distinguishes this war and the resulting strain in Qatar–Iran relations is the degree to which it has exposed internal divisions within Hamas. The movement appears split between a pro-Iran armed majority and a Qatar-aligned politburo: a schism that may prove its undoing.

Beyond Hamas, the PIJ continues to steadily decline. In April 2023, the group’s secretary-general Ziyad al-Nakhalah boasted that Iran had given “billions of dollars” to Gazan militias in order to realise the “certainty” of Israel’s destruction. Today, PIJ operatives are being systematically eliminated by the IDF and arrested by security forces in Ahmed al-Sharaa’s Syria. Akram al-Ajouri, the PIJ’s deputy secretary-general and head of its military wing, was recently targeted in an Israeli airstrike on Iran. If the Gaza disarmament plan drawn up by Trump’s “Board of Peace” is effectively implemented, the PIJ is likely to be forced underground.

In Yemen, the Houthis are recalculating their precarious position. A Zaydi Shi’ite mercenary outfit with significant Iranian backing, they have evolved considerably from their humble origins as an assembly of Islamist boy scouts in the early 1990s. They are not the primitive terror-pirates they are often depicted to be; they are a political force to be reckoned with in their own right that can operate independently of Tehran’s agenda. As of Saturday 28 March, the Houthis are actively supporting Iran’s forces, against efforts by Saudi diplomats to prevent a wider escalation in the Gulf of Aden—an outcome that would threaten the Bab al-Mandab Strait, another vital shipping corridor already under strain from the ongoing crisis in the Strait of Hormuz.

The Houthis have an axe to grind with Israel for eliminating their senior leadership in September. Yet if they truly believed in Iran’s chances, they wouldn’t have waited until now to begin their offensive campaign. Their months of inaction reveal a loss of faith in the Islamic Republic, which means they are unlikely to remain an active participant in the conflict for very long. Catherine Perez-Shakdam, a colleague of mine who spent years living in war-torn Yemen, wrote in early 2025 that the Houthis might even permanently forgo their offensives on Israel if doing so secures international recognition and a seat at the negotiating table. If they anticipate and hope to exploit a post-war resurgence of Saudi–UAE rivalry over Yemen to launder their own political legitimacy, they may decide that the price of assisting Iran is too steep.

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In Syria, the Assad regime has been replaced by a leadership hostile to both Iran and Hezbollah and aligned with Erdoğan’s neo-Ottoman ambitions. Ahmed al-Sharaa’s legitimacy as a transitional leader is often (and rightly) called into question given his previous affiliations with al-Qaeda. Yet his track record of Sunni extremism has not prevented the negotiation of security arrangements with Israel that amount to de facto recognition and a potential path to normalisation. Significant obstacles remain in navigating Israel–Syria relations, and we should not ignore the threat of gentrified neo-jihadism. Nevertheless, the moment al-Sharaa’s rebel factions seized power in December 2024, the pro-Iran “ring of fire” that Soleimani envisioned closing in around Israel was extinguished. 

In Iraq, a network of Iran-backed militias is currently bracing for impact in a war it has little chance of winning. The PMF has reportedly lost fifteen fighters in a recent American airstrike on its outposts in western Anbar, prompting the Iraqi National Security Council to endorse retaliatory action by the group. Kataib Hezbollah, a Shi’ite militia with significant influence within the PMF, threatened “total war” in January in the event of an attack on Iran; it is now calling for a ceasefire with American forces. With its only relatively intact Middle Eastern node intent on strategic retreat, the IRGC’s decades of careful planning are now heading into oblivion.

The question that naturally arises now is what comes next. Many observers fail to see that, in this war, the “day after” is already unfolding in real time. With the notable exception of Oman, which has long allowed the IRGC to exploit its enclave in Musandam as a nexus for illicit smuggling and operational planning, the Gulf states are now broadly aligned against any Iranian retention of nuclear or even ballistic capabilities. Along with Jordan, they have collectively warned of sleeper cells that threaten to further destabilise the region. Qatar has arrested IRGC agents operating on its soil, while Kuwait’s security apparatus has foiled an attempted assassination of its leaders by Hezbollah.

As the Gulf weathers the storm of Iranian aggression, a new school of thought is emerging in the UAE—one that questions the reliability of supranational bodies such as the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in response to their inaction on Iran. Anwar Gargash, the UAE’s chief diplomatic adviser, captured this sentiment when he asked: “The Gulf states have long been a pillar of support and a partner to all in times of prosperity. So, where are you today in this moment of hardship?” The Emirates has been an incubator of better ideas in the Gulf, and Gargash’s comments suggest a further move away from the Arabo-Islamic unilateralism that has long hampered progress in the region. What began with the Abraham Accords is unlikely to end there.

The war with Iran presents a commercial opportunity in a renewed Middle East, underpinned by the dismantling of Islamist power structures and motivated by a race to outcompete China. It could also reduce the risk of energy shocks among America’s NATO partners in Europe as they phase out reliance on Russian natural gas. Three US-led frameworks emerge in this recalibration. The first is the Abraham Accords, the bedrock of Trumpian diplomacy in the Middle East, long hailed as proof that active normalisation with Israel is not only possible, but necessary and profitable. The second is Pax Silica, an economic-security program established in December to build a secure global semiconductor supply chain. The Trump administration has announced a voluntary transnational investment consortium that includes Israel, Qatar, and the UAE, and which will invest over US$1 trillion in energy projects linked to the initiative. The third is the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), a revolutionary network stretching from Mumbai to Marseilles that will deliver transportation, energy, and digital infrastructure connecting dozens of countries and billions of people. 

It is only when the Iranian nuclear threat is removed from the equation that America’s plans for a 21st-century Silk Road become fully executable. Hence, Trump’s controversial announcement of negotiations with the regime—promptly denied by Iranian leadership—appears to have been a tactic to temper oil prices ahead of market opening. In reality, US efforts are focused on the removal of an estimated 400 kilogrammes of sixty percent enriched uranium from Iran, much of which is stored underground at facilities in Isfahan. Trump says he is willing to “unleash hell” to ensure that his grand strategy is not derailed by Iran’s weakened regime. Strikes on Iran are resuming in full force as its leadership continues to reject American proposals, and the Axis of Resistance may yet give way to an Axis of Renewal.

As the Middle East marches towards a new reality, European decision-makers should not remain paralysed. The Axis of Resistance is only the nearest layer of the Iranian Threat Network (ITN)—a global project aimed at exporting the Islamic Revolution and exacting revenge on the West for its perceived subjugation of the Islamic world during the colonial era. Across North Africa and Western Europe, criminal networks and mercenary outfits remain active. The Islamic Republic may collapse in Iran, but its legacy will endure through them. 

The first of these groups is the Polisario Front, a Marxist militia that seeks to establish a separatist state in the Moroccan Sahara. It is armed by Iran and hosted by Algeria in Tindouf, a UN-designated humanitarian zone and (as usual) a haven for the region’s worst abusers of human rights. Polisario militants have been described as the “Houthis of West Africa” for their mercenary role in Sahelian jihadist movements, most recently by Ted Cruz, who introduced a bill in the US Senate on 13 March to designate the group as a foreign terrorist organisation. The UN’s recognition of Morocco’s autonomy plan for the Sahara in November would appear to undercut the Polisario’s stated mission, leaving it with little reason to remain in Tindouf. Yet the group is unlikely to disappear; it will instead seek to aggravate existing tensions across North Africa, potentially driving further migration into Western and Central Europe. As European leaders grow increasingly reliant on Algerian natural gas to offset energy shortfalls amid the Iran crisis, they risk financing forces that could ultimately work against their own interests.

The second is closer to home and arguably even more dangerous for European citizens. A network of Iranian-linked and heavily sanctioned criminal organisations across Europe already exists, including the Mocro Mafia in Belgium and the Netherlands and the Foxtrot Network in Sweden. These groups have already carried out targeted attacks on behalf of the Islamic Republic. Yet if Iranian financing dries up, they will almost certainly find new sponsors. The greatest cause for concern is with a new arrival to the Islamist landscape in Europe: Harakat As’hab al-Yamin al-Islamiyya (HAYI), or the Islamic Movement of the Companions of the Right. An explosion near a synagogue in Liège; a molotov cocktail thrown at the entrance of a synagogue in Rotterdam; another explosion at a Jewish school in Amsterdam; an arson attack against four United Hatzolah ambulances in London: a vehicle set ablaze in the Jewish Quarter of Antwerp. As’hab al-Yamin has claimed responsibility for all of these acts. One wonders exactly who these antisemitic pyromaniacs are, and why we haven’t heard of them until now. 

The name is found in Surah al-Waqi‘ah, specifically 56:38 (not 56:28 as inaccurately reported in the Jerusalem Post). It is a doomsday passage in the Qur’an that promises “extended shade, flowing water, abundant fruit … [and] virgin maidens” (56:30–37) in Paradise to the warriors of Islam, known as the Companions of the Right. According to the scholar Ja‘far al-Sadiq (702–765), the Sixth Imam of Twelver Shi’ism to which the Islamic Republic adheres, those who frequently recite this passage will grow spiritually closer to Ali ibn Abi Talib (600–661), considered the First Imam. The group’s logo is virtually identical to those already used by the IRGC and its proxies: a rifle pointing rightwards with a globe beneath it. In Arabic, al-Waqi‘ah means “the Inevitable,” a direct reference to the resurrection of the dead in Islamic eschatology. The chosen name is itself a coded message—a subtle yet potent indication that this is a transnational militant Shi’ite sleeper cell that has lain dormant for years. 

Who exactly leads As’hab al-Yamin remains unclear, though its members are probably drawn from Iraqi and Lebanese Shi’ite diasporic communities in the West and receive direction from Iran. The group maintains an active Telegram presence, through which it warns “all the peoples of the world, especially in the European Union,” to keep away from “all American and Zionist interests.” The EU is singled out in its messaging, and this may reflect a form of retaliation after the EU added the IRGC to its terror list in late January. These attacks are neither random nor impulsive; they are the result of careful intelligence-gathering by the IRGC on foreign soil, about which Israel has long warned the West.

To reap the rewards of renewed strategic coherence in the Middle East, Western leaders must adopt a hard line: proscribe these groups as terrorist organisations and pursue robust law enforcement against those who support or enable violence. They cannot continue to assume that the Islamic Republic is here to stay, or that Israel’s campaign of regime decapitation and attrition is bound to fail. Israel and the United States have already done much to dismantle the Axis of Resistance, but the broader network supported by Iran remains most active in Western Europe—and will continue to grow so long as policymakers combine caution abroad with timidity at home. If Europe wishes to play a critical role in shaping a prosperous future elsewhere, it must first confront and address its own challenges with state-backed Islamist extremism.