Iran Needs Not Just Revolution, But Sustained Order

A reply to Benny Morris’s “Toppling a Tyrant.”

Benny Morris is right to describe the killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as a historic rupture. Few historians have brought greater clarity to the moral and strategic realities of Middle Eastern conflict, and his analysis captures both the scale of the moment and the narrowness of the opportunity it presents. The removal of a Supreme Leader who dominated Iranian politics for nearly four decades is not merely an operational success. It is a structural shock to a regime built around centralised ideological authority and coercive control.

But shock is not settlement. The decisive question now is not whether the assassination was justified or effective. It is whether the force that produced this rupture will be connected to a durable institutional outcome. History offers many examples of regimes wounded or decapitated only to regenerate in altered but equally dangerous form. If this moment is to become something more than an episode in an ongoing cycle of confrontation, several conditions must follow in disciplined sequence.

The first requirement is unified control of strategic assets. The Islamic Republic’s power has always rested not only on ideology, but on control of nuclear infrastructure, ballistic missile capabilities, and the complex command structure of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The most dangerous outcome is not regime survival. It is fragmentation. If authority splinters—if IRGC commanders act autonomously, if fissile material becomes vulnerable, if missile systems fall under uncertain chains of command—the risks multiply rapidly. A regime can survive the loss of a leader. It cannot survive the uncontrolled diffusion of its coercive instruments without creating regional instability. The transitional moment must therefore begin with visible, credible consolidation of command.

Second, transitional authority must move quickly from provisional status to structured legitimacy. Reports of a temporary governing council and deliberations within the Assembly of Experts are significant, but insufficient. A clear constitutional roadmap must be articulated. The legal status of security forces during transition must be clarified. A public commitment to nonproliferation must be made early, not as a concession to foreign powers but as a stabilising signal to domestic and regional audiences. Revolutions are often lost in the vacuum between collapse and institutional formation. Without structure, the most organised coercive actor tends to prevail by default.

Third, economic stabilisation is not secondary. It is central. Iran’s oil infrastructure, revenue channels, currency stability, and basic services will determine whether popular relief translates into civic participation or social breakdown. Severe economic dislocation can accelerate regime collapse, but it can just as easily produce factional competition, militia financing, and desperation. Economic continuity is not an indulgence extended to a wounded regime. It is an architectural requirement for preventing chaos. If the population experiences only further collapse, the legitimacy of any transitional authority will erode before it can consolidate.

Fourth, external actors must recognise that sustained enforcement is more important than dramatic tempo. Morris rightly emphasises that a short campaign is unlikely to suffice if the objective is regime transformation. But even sustained bombing does not equal sustained architecture. Maritime protection in the Strait of Hormuz, suppression of proxy financing networks, regional missile defence coordination, and multi-year sanction regimes tied to institutional benchmarks will be necessary if the strategic environment is to change rather than reset. Just as important is political endurance in Washington. Containment strategies that collapse with electoral cycles undermine deterrence and embolden adversaries. The decisive variable is not intensity. It is continuity.

Fifth, the Iranian public sphere must be protected if it is to become a stabilising force rather than a casualty of transition. Both President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu have expressed hope that renewed demonstrations will accelerate regime change. But protest without protection becomes massacre. Internet access, civic organisation, and basic civil protections must be preserved. If the transition is perceived as a power struggle among elites rather than a structural shift toward accountable governance, public trust will evaporate. Durable transformation requires more than the removal of a tyrant. It requires the emergence of credible institutions.

There are, moreover, three failure modes that must be consciously avoided. Security fragmentation inside Iran would magnify proliferation risk. A rapid oil shock could trigger international backlash and political retreat in the United States. Proxy escalation without sustained suppression could regionalise the conflict beyond control. Preventing these outcomes is as important as encouraging institutional change.

Benny Morris has identified the narrow window that now exists. History does not frequently offer such ruptures. But history also teaches that decapitation alone does not guarantee durable transformation. The fall of a tyrant creates opportunity. It does not create order. If this moment is connected to unified command, economic continuity, sustained enforcement, and structured transition, it may mark the beginning of a strategic reorientation. If not, it will become another episode in a long cycle of confrontation.

The true test is not whether a ruler has fallen. It is whether governance follows.

—Allen Zeesman